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Abstract 
Recent years have witnessed a significant resurgence in the debate concerning the optimal 
substantive standard to be used in the enforcement of competition law. One of the arguments 
proposed for using a Consumer Surplus standard, is that, when firms can choose from a 
number of mutually exclusive actions, it may induce firms to adopt actions that lead to a 
higher level of total welfare than would a Total Welfare standard. This important basic 
insight, initially due to Lyons (2002), has been discussed and extended in the recent literature 
always in the context of mergers. In this paper we generalise and re-examine this argument 
for any potentially anti-competitive action – we have in particular in mind actions often 
challenged as attempted monopolisation (abuse of dominance) or vertical restraints, taken by 
firms in different environments. We show that in the absence of any efficiencies the two 
standards lead to exactly the same outcomes but a choice between them becomes important in 
the presence of efficiencies. With positive marginal-cost reducing efficiencies we confirm the 
presence of what we term a Lyons-effect in our more general setting. We then examine how 
the choice of standard depends on a number of relevant parameters. Most important in terms 
of their policy implications are the results that the Consumer Surplus standard will be the 
optimal choice, when the extant market power is significant, when the size of marginal cost-
reducing efficiency effects is large and when the difference in the market power raising 
effects of mutually exclusive actions is large. These results are important since they suggest 
that in all cases where significant extant market power is a prerequisite for the enforcement of 
Competition Law it is best to use a Consumer Surplus standard. 
 
JEL Classification: L4 Antitrust Policy, K21 Antitrust Law 
Keywords: Antitrust enforcement, Antitrust law, Consumer Surplus Standard, Substantive 
Standards, Total Welfare Standard. 
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1. Introduction and Brief Review  
Recent years have witnessed a significant resurgence in the theoretical and policy 
debate concerning the optimal substantive standard in the enforcement of competition law. 
As Baker and Salop (2015) note, the debate today is often framed as a choice between the 
consumer surplus and the total welfare standards, though other, including non-economic 
goals, have been proposed too
1
. While the debate goes on,  Competition Authorities (CA) in 
EU and USA, appear to continue to use a Consumer Surplus (CS) standard instead of a Total 
Welfare (TW) standard for appraising firms’ practices under competition law.  Thus : 
• In the EU, the Commission’s 2008 Guidance Paper on Art. 102 EC2 states (in par. 5) 
that the Commission “will focus on those types of conduct that are most harmful to 
consumers”. Par. 19 reiterates that the aim is to protect consumer welfare and links 
the concept of “anticompetitive foreclosure” directly to consumer welfare.  
• The latest version of Merger Guidelines in US3 clearly states that “the Agency 
considers whether cognizable efficiencies likely would be sufficient to reverse the 
merger’s potential harm to consumers in the relevant market, e.g. by preventing price 
increases in that market” which explicitly suggest that when prices are raised because 
of a merger, then this merger should be banned irrespective of cost efficiencies for the 
merging firms. Only if cost savings are large enough so that they are passed through 
to consumers and prices do not raise a merger will be allowed. 
                                                          
1
 See, for earlier contributions, Besanko and Spulber (1993); Neven and Röller (2000); Lyons (2002); and, more recently, 
Padilla (2005); Carlton (2007); Farell and Katz (2006); Heyer (2006); Fridolfsson (2007); Pittman (2007); Salop (2010); 
Armstrong and Vickers (2010); Kaplow (2011); Baker (2013); Hovenkamp (2013); Lianos (2013); Blair and Sokol (2013); 
Fox et.al (1987), Farrell and Katz (2006), and other references in Baker and Salop (2015), footnote 52. The latter propose 
that the consumer surplus standard “also helps to address inequality” (p. 12).  See also Warden (2014).  
2Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying Article 102 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary 
Conduct by Dominant Undertakings, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 3 December 2008. 
3U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, (last version issued in 
August 19, 2010) available at: http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/horiz_book/hmg1.html. 
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• Salop (2010) after reviewing the US evidence associated with a large number of 
specific antitrust cases
4
 concludes that the standard that has been used and is still used 
in USA by antitrust authorities and by courts is the CS standard. 
On the other hand, the authorities in Canada and Australia seem clearly to have been 
moving towards a TW standard. Thus, Section 96 of the Canadian Competition Act directs 
the Tribunal not to issue an order against a merger if “..(it) is likely to bring gains in 
efficiency that will be greater than and will offset, the effects of any prevention or lessening of 
competition that will result or is likely to result from the merger”
5
. Section 90.9 of the 
Competition Consumer Act 2010 in Australia states that an authorization for an acquisition 
may be granted if it “…would result, or be likely to result, in such a benefit to the public that 
the acquisition should be allowed to take place”. 
From a theoretical point of view the arguments for and against using a CS or a TW 
substantive standard have revolved around three main sets of issues, specifically
6
: 
1. Issues relating to distributional considerations  
2. Dynamic issues  
3. Issues emerging from the interaction between firms and competition authorities
7
. 
A number of reviews of all the above issues have appeared in recent years. Probably the 
clearest synopsis of arguments in favour of a CS standard is contained in Salop (2010) while 
that in favour of a TW standard (stressing dynamic issues) is contained in Carlton (2007)
8
. 
The focus of this paper is on the third set of issues mentioned above. In relation to this 
Salop (2010) argues that adopting the TW standard may lead firms to engage in inefficient 
                                                          
4
  Including mergers, horizontal agreements, predatory pricing, monopsony conduct, and harm to competitors (from mergers 
or exclusionary conduct). 
5 The recent Canadian Supreme Court merger decision on Tervito puts efficiencies even more front and center in merger 
enforcement procedures in Canada.  
6 Other than issues relating to administrability that could favor a CS standard - Hoverkamp (2013). 
7 Often modelled in the presence of information asymmetries.  
8
 Other excellent reviews of the main arguments discussing the pros and cons without in the end taking a clear stance in 
favour of one of the standards are contained in Farrell and Katz (2006) and in Kaplow (2011). Also Motta (2004) and Pitman 
(2007). 
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economic conduct that harms consumers and lowers aggregate welfare relative to the use of a 
CS standard. Farrell and Katz (2006) also provide an extensive discussion of this set of 
issues
9
 and have stressed that even if we accept that the appropriate ultimate goal is that of 
total welfare maximization, there might nevertheless be good reasons why we would want the 
CAs to whom we delegate the task of enforcing competition policy to pursue a narrower 
objective of consumer surplus but the arguments in these economic analyses have “not yet 
been thoroughly explored”
10
. 
Our analysis goes back to the insight of Lyons (2002) who examined firms choosing 
among mutually exclusive mergers anticipating the decision that a CA will take as to whether 
or not to allow the merger. Under some circumstances welfare may be higher if the CA uses a 
CS standard than if it uses a TW standard, since the former will deter firms from taking 
certain actions and lead them to take actions that are better from the point of view of overall 
welfare. Since Lyons (2002), a number of papers have discussed or further pursued this 
issue
11
. However all this discussion has again been conducted in the context of mergers.   
In this paper we make two main contributions. First, we generalize the analysis to the 
case where firms choose between mutually exclusive potentially anticompetitive actions of 
any type. Second, we examine how the choice of the standard depends on the environment of 
firms taking the action (such as the level of their extant market power) and on the size of cost 
efficiencies generated by the action. Concerning the type of action, we include here vertical 
restraints and actions often challenged as attempted monopolisation (or abuse of dominance 
in EU).  Examples include the following: 
(a) Marketing products under alternative tying/bundling arrangements. 
(b) Offering different conditional rebate schemes. 
                                                          
9
 By reviewing also the papers by Lyons (2002), Besanko and Spulber (1993) and Neven and Röller (2005). 
10 Farrell and Katz (2006), p. 32. 
11
 Apart from Farrell and Katz (2006) mentioned above see also Nocke and Whinston (2010, 2011); Armstrong and Vickers 
(2010). 
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(c) Offering exclusive contracts with differing non-compete clauses. 
(d) Engaging in vertical restraints of different types. 
As for the case of mergers, it is well known that these actions will often entail both 
market power raising effects as well as potentially significant efficiency effects
12
, both of 
which form an integral part of our model below. Further, in our model, firms differ in the 
environment from which they come, which is specified in quite a general way, through the 
elasticity of demand in the competitive counterfactual and thus the price–raising potential of 
anticompetitive actions and through the extant market power that firms enjoy. Thus, the 
extent to which actions of some specific type influence prices, consumer surplus, profits and 
total welfare depends on the market-power raising and the (marginal) cost-reducing effects of 
these actions and also on the nature of the environment from which the firm taking the action 
comes. This allows us to consider also the implications of different environments and their 
distribution for the optimal choice of standards. 
  We find that when there are not mutually exclusive actions between which firms can 
choose the TW standard dominates the CS standard. Also, in the absence of any efficiencies 
the two standards lead to exactly the same outcomes. And, the TW standard (at least weakly) 
dominates the CS standard when actions do not generate marginal cost-reducing efficiency 
effects. However, a choice between the two standards becomes very important when there are 
positive marginal cost-reducing efficiencies
13
. 
In the presence of marginal cost-reducing efficiency effects and considering first 
actions that are equivalent in terms of their cost reducing potential, total welfare for any given 
environment is smaller when higher-profit actions are chosen. And, while higher profit 
actions may pass a TW standard they may not pass a CS standard. So, as we show, there will 
                                                          
12 See for example O’Donoghue and Padilla (2007) and Whinston (2006). 
13
 Thus, our analysis does not support Motta’s contention that “consumer and total welfare standards would not often imply 
very different decisions” (Motta, 2004, p.20) unless one assumes that efficiency effects are indeed rare, an assumption not 
supported by received wisdom about the effects of mergers, vertical restraints or indeed of many of the practices that can be 
used for attempted monopolisation.   
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exist environments
14
 for which having a CS standard may induce firms to choose lower-profit 
actions that result in higher welfare than would higher-profit actions, which would be chosen 
under a TW standard. This is what might be termed the Lyons Effect. However, there will be 
other environments for which welfare is higher when a TW standard is used, because the CS 
standard may be too strict and deter firms from taking any action even though there are 
welfare-enhancing actions that could have been chosen. We characterize the environments 
under which the Lyons effect will (or will not) emerge, and show that whether a CS standard 
generates higher welfare than a TW standard will depend on the distribution of firms across 
these different environments.  
Most importantly, in terms of policy implications, we examine how the range of 
environments over which the Lyons-effect is present depends on parameters such as the extant 
market power of the firms, the size of marginal cost-reducing efficiency effects
15
 and the 
strength of the market power raising effect generated by different actions. With symmetric 
efficiencies across actions, we show that the arguments in favour of a CS standard are, ceteris 
paribus, more likely to be valid when the actions challenged are undertaken by firms that 
have significant market power to start with. Also, ceteris paribus, a CS standard is more 
likely to be optimal when we deal with actions (such as tying/bundling and vertical contracts) 
that, we understand on the basis of economic theory and evidence, can generate substantial 
efficiencies. These results are important since they suggest that in all cases where significant 
extant market power is a prerequisite for the enforcement of Competition Law it is best to use 
a CS standard, especially when we expect that actions are likely to generate substantial 
efficiencies
16
. 
                                                          
14 Characterized by the elasticity in the competitive counterfactual and the extant market power. 
15 When these are symmetric across actions and the latter differ only in terms of their market power enhancing effects. 
16 These include essentially all cases other than the cases of horizontal collusive agreements or cartels for which, our analysis 
suggests that, the choice of standard is not important since they are not going to be associated with marginal cost-reducing 
efficiencies. 
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The examination of actions differing also in marginal cost-reduction shows that, when 
there are significant asymmetries in the efficiencies of the different actions the TW standard 
will be the optimal choice.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we set out our model. In Section 
3 we use this model to undertake a detailed comparison of CS and TW standards first 
assuming symmetric efficiency effects between mutually exclusive actions and then assuming 
that the actions also differ in terms of their marginal cost-reducing effects. Finally, Section 4 
offers concluding remarks. 
 
2. A Model 
2.1 Basic Assumptions 
Suppose that a number of firms from a range of environments are considering taking a 
type of action which will result in their increasing their market power and so their price-cost 
margin, but can also have some efficiency benefits, including driving down their marginal 
costs. There may be many potential actions of this type any one firm can take, each 
associated with particular levels of cost reduction and increase in the price-cost margin. In 
particular we will always allow for the default action of doing nothing and so neither 
increasing price nor lowering cost. Firms can choose which action within this class to take. 
In making this decision firms take account of the possibility that a CA will assess 
their action and, if it is ruled to be anti-competitive in the light of the specific standard used 
by the CA, their action will be disallowed and they will have to pay a penalty.   
Here we assume for simplicity that: 
(i) all actions that are taken will be detected and assessed by the CA – in other words, the 
coverage or detection rate is unity;  
9 
 
(ii) the CA can determine absolutely accurately whether or not the action is anti-
competitive in the light of its standard – there are no Type I or Type II errors;  
(iii) there are no delays by the CA in detecting anti-competitive actions and reaching 
decisions
17
. 
We consider two different standards that the CA might use: 
• a Consumer Surplus standard 
• a Total Welfare standard that is based on the sum of both consumer and producer 
surplus
18
 (profit). 
We assume that firms know what standard the CA will use and have the capacity to 
determine what impact any action they take will have on the welfare standard (CS or TW 
standard) used by the CA. Given our assumptions about the capacity of the CA, firms will 
anticipate making negative (positive) profits if they take an action that produces a negative 
(positive) value of the CA’s standard. Firms will choose the action that gives them the highest 
private benefit given the anticipated reaction of the CA.  
We are interested in how social welfare depends on the standard being used by the 
CA. To consider this we will use the following model. 
 
2.2 The Model 
2.2.1 Description of the counterfactual/default position 
Consider a typical firm that faces the following demand function: 
         (1) 
                                                          
17 For a recent paper discussing optimal antitrust enforcement in the presence of imperfect detection, decision errors and 
delays, see Katsoulacos and Ulph (2015). 
18 In this paper we only consider the profit of the firm that takes the action and not the loss/benefit of other firms’ (e.g 
competitors or firms that produce supplementary products) that might be affected by the action. In a sequel paper we deal 
with this extension. 
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Assume that the firm has a technology with constant marginal costs of production, c.  Let 
( )0 0 0, ,p Q c  denote, respectively, the price, output and unit costs in the “but-for”/ 
default/counterfactual position. We use the normalisation that
0 1c = .  
We notice that if the firm has no market power in the default position, in which case 
        (2) 
then and so ε denotes the inverse elasticity of demand evaluated in the 
competitive counterfactual price and output configuration. In what follows we will use ε as a 
parameter that reflects the underlying competitiveness of the industry and so the potential for 
raising price that a firm will face if, given its initial cost, it can raise its market power so 
charge a price above marginal cost
19
. We could also say that ε measures the incentive for 
raising price at the competitive counterfactual.  
To allow for the possibility of extant market power, we want to allow for the 
possibility that the “but-for” price is above marginal cost, and so the initial price – cost 
margin lies somewhere between zero and that which would prevail under monopoly, which, it 
is easy to see, would be 
2
ε
. However since we are interested in the possibility of firms taking 
anti-competitive actions that could increase their market power we want to exclude the 
possibility that the counterfactual situation is one of monopoly. So we assume that:  
    (3) 
where  is the parameter measuring the extent of market power in the counterfactual 
situation (extant market power).  
                                                          
19
 Easy to see that ε measures the rate at which  the firm’s profits would increase if it raised price above 
0 1c =  
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In what follows, we will denote the environment from which a firm comes by 
( )0,e ε µ= , and define the set of possible environments as20: 
   ( )0 0 1, 0, 0
2
E e ε µ ε µ = = > ≤ < 
 
.    (4) 
 
2.2.2 Potentially anticompetitive action  
Now suppose that, starting from this counterfactual position, the firm undertakes an action 
which both increases its market power – in a way specified below - but also has a price-
reducing efficiency effect which lowers marginal costs by  
1 11 , 0 1oc c c c c∆ = − = − ≤ ∆ < 21     (5) 
Now, given the demand function (1), if a firm with marginal costs 
1 1c c= −∆  were a 
monopolist, then its price-cost margin would be 
2
cε + ∆
.  So assume that the price-cost 
margin after taking the action is 
   ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1p c c p cµ ε µε µ− = + ∆ ⇒ = + − ∆ − 22  (6) 
where 
1
, 0
2
µ µ≤ ≤  measures the market power that the firm exercises by taking this action.  
In order for this action to be anti-competitive we assume that it would lead to an 
increase in price if there are no marginal cost-reducing efficiency effects ( )i.e.  0c∆ = .    
From (3) and (6) this requires that the degree of market power associated with this action, µ, 
has to satisfy the condition:  
01
2
µ µ≥ > .         
                                                          
20 However, for clarity, whenever below we refer to a firm’s “environment” but keeping extant market power constant we 
will be using ε (rather than e).  
21
 At some points in the later discussion we will want to allow for the possibility that these anti-competitive actions could 
have other cost-reducing efficiency effects, 0F∆ ≥  which have no effect on marginal costs - and hence no effects on 
prices and consumer surplus – but lower fixed costs and so increase both profits and total welfare.  However since our focus 
is on the effects of anti-competitive actions on market power and any associated efficiencies affecting marginal costs, we 
will not explicitly include the parameter F∆  in our description of an action. 
22 The associated output is  ( )1 (1 ) 0Q cµ ε= − ∆ + >  
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In what follows an action will be denoted by ( ),a cµ= ∆  and, for a firm from 
environment e E∈ , the class of anti-competitive actions available to that firm will be: 
       (7)  
Note that, of course, the degree of extant market power constrains the increment in 
market power that an anti-competitive action can have
23
. 
 
2.2.3 Effect of action on price 
From (3) and (6), the change in price generated by an action can be expressed as: 
      (8)  
so we also have: 
     (9) 
and 
           (10) 
From (8), whether or not the price rises or falls depends in part on the nature of the action 
taken (µ and ∆c), and in part on the environment from which the firm comes - the parameters 
ε  andµ0 . In particular, for any given , and , if initially there is no market 
power ( ), then in environments with very low inverse elasticities (ε when there is no 
initial market power) prices will fall, while in environments with very large inverse 
elasticities prices will rise. The presence of extant market power  dampens a price rise 
and magnifies a price reduction
24
.  
 
2.2.4 Effects of action on consumer surplus, profit and total welfare 
                                                          
23 Though this is obvious, it is often seemingly forgotten, as when making unqualified statements that a pre-requisite for 
investigating a firm is that it has significant extant market power but for a liability finding we also require a significant 
increment in the market power. 
24
 This is what we should expect as when the firm has extant market power the original product price will be high and this 
will lower the possibilities for raising prices even further.  
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We can now calculate the change in consumer surplus, profits and hence total welfare when a 
typical firm takes a typical action.  
The change in consumer surplus is: 
 and given   
       
so since ∆Q = -∆p, as expected, the sign of this will be driven entirely by the change in price. 
Given (9), by substituting into the expression above: 
  
or: 
∆CS(a,e) =
1
2
[(1− µ)2 (∆c+ ε )2 − ε 2(1− µ0 )2 ]      (11) 
The increase in profits (private benefit) from taking the action is: 
      
where ∆F are profit-enhancing efficiencies that do not lead to price reductions (such as fixed 
cost savings).  
So from (10) and (6) and since       
∆Π(a,e) = µ(1− µ)(∆c+ ε )2 − ε 2µ0 (1− µ0 )+ ∆F       (12) 
The change in total welfare is just the change in consumer surplus, plus the change in profits 
(producer surplus): 
 
      
and, making the relevant substitutions from above: 
   (13) 
or   (13’)
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The first term in (13) is positive and shows the benefits to society from a reduction in costs if 
output were to remain at its original level. However, we need also to take into account the 
change in output. If price falls and consequently output increases then there is an 
unambiguous increase in welfare since the change in both consumer surplus and producer 
surplus are both positive. However, if the net result of the action is to drive prices up and so 
cause output to fall, then while society benefits from the fall in costs it loses from the 
reduction in output and overall welfare might fall. This will certainly happen when the 
reduction in marginal costs is very small
25
. 
Note finally, the case where no action is taken. This can be thought of as taking the 
default action characterised by the pair ( ,0), in which case the change in consumer surplus, 
profit and welfare are all zero irrespective of the environment from which a firm comes. 
The expressions in (11), (12) and (13’) show how the change in Consumer Surplus, 
Profits and Total Welfare depend on:  
• the nature of a typical action as captured by the parameters ; 
• the nature of the environment from which a firm comes, as captured by the parameters 
ε and . 
We now want to understand in more detail the nature of this relationship.  
 
2.2.5 The properties of ∆CS, ∆Π and ∆W and the case of a single trivial action 
For any non-trivial action  we have the following results
26
:  
Lemma 1: The change in consumer surplus is, from (11), a strictly increasing function of , 
a strictly decreasing function of µ, a strictly concave quadratic function of ε and (and so 
                                                          
25
 Unless of course the other, profit-enhancing efficiencies are large.  
 
26 In this section we concentrate on the effects of ε. The influence of the extant market power  ( µ0  ) on ∆CS and ∆W is 
discussed in detail in Section 3 below.  
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inverse U-shaped in ε and in ). Also, if    then the change in consumer 
surplus is positive, while if  it is negative.  
In other words, as we would expect: 
- Consumers benefit from lower marginal costs and lose from an increase in the 
price-cost margin; and 
- Using a CS standard, there is a critical value of the underlying competitiveness of 
the industry (as expressed by ε) such that the action is beneficial if the 
environment is potentially more competitive than that determined by this critical 
value, and harmful when it is potentially less competitive.   
Lemma 2: For any environment and any non-trivial action, the change in profits is positive 
and is, from (12), a strictly increasing function of both  and µ and also a strictly increasing 
but convex function of ε and a strictly decreasing but convex function of .  So, as expected: 
- Firms benefit from both lower costs and anything that allows them to charge a 
higher price-cost margin; 
- A higher initial price-cost margin decreases the increase on the profits from an 
anticompetitive action
27
.  
- The more potentially uncompetitive is the environment (the bigger the ε) the 
bigger is the increase in profits.  
Lemma 3: The change in total welfare is, from (13’), a strictly increasing function of , a 
strictly decreasing function of µ, a strictly increasing and strictly convex function of   and a 
strictly concave quadratic function of ε (and so inverse U-shaped in ε).  If   
                                                          
27
 The reason for this is because as we have seen from equation (8) as the extant market power increases it dampens a price 
rise and magnifies a price reduction. 
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then the change in total welfare is positive. It is easy to see that there exists an such 
that the change in total welfare is positive if  and negative if  . Assuming ∆F=0, 
this is given by   which is greater than So: 
- While everyone in society benefits from a reduction in marginal costs, the loss to 
consumers from an increase in market power and thus in the price-cost margin 
when  outweighs the benefit to firms and overall total welfare falls.   
- Using a TW standard, there is a critical value of the inverse price elasticity of the 
competitive equilibrium, , such that the action is beneficial if the 
environment is potentially more competitive than that determined by this critical 
value, and harmful when it is potentially less competitive. 
- The critical value of the inverse price elasticity of the competitive position is 
higher for a TW standard than for a CS standard, so, as we would expect, there are 
environments which would be judged to be harmful using a CS standard but 
benign using a TW standard. 
Note that the results above lead immediately to: 
Proposition 1  
If there is just a single non-trivial action that firms can take, then welfare is always 
higher under a TW standard than under a CS standard.  
Proposition 1 can be easily understood by looking in Figure 1.The reason is as follows: 
- When a firm with extant market power  comes from an environment for which 
, the action will be allowed and taken under both CS and TW standards. 
- When the firm with extant market power  comes from an environment for 
which  then the action will not be allowed and so it will not be taken under 
neither a CS nor a TW standard. 
17 
 
- However, when the firm comes from an environment for which   then 
the action will not be allowed under a CS standard but will be allowed under a 
TW standard and this will contribute positively to aggregate social welfare.   
(Figure 1 here) 
Proposition 1 tells us that when it is not likely that firms will have alternative mutually 
exclusive options it is best to use a TW standard. 
  
3. Comparison of standards in the presence of mutually exclusive actions 
Suppose now that there are more than one non-trivial mutually exclusive actions. Each 
action j has a price-cost margin raising effect as expressed by parameter  and a marginal 
cost efficiency effect expressed by parameter . So, simplifying notation, equations (11), 
(12) and (13) (with ∆F = 0), now take the following form:  
∆CSj (aj ,e) =
1
2
[(1− µ j )
2 (∆cj + ε )
2 − ε 2 (1− µ0 )2 ]      (11’) 
∆Π j (aj ,e) = µ j (1− µ j )(∆cj + ε )
2 − ε 2µ0(1− µ0 )       (12’) 
  (13’’) 
 
3.1 Comparison of CSS and TWS for the case where efficiencies are the same across 
actions 
     Assume further that just two actions are available with  where , 
and simplify by firstly confining attention to the case where they have the same value of 
∆c ≥ 0 , ( ) and consequently differ solely in µ, the extent to which they 
increase the price-cost margin. 
Consider first the case where ∆c = 0  (no marginal-cost reducing efficiencies). 
18 
 
Proposition 2   
Given two mutually exclusive actions with : 
(i) in the absence of any efficiencies it makes absolutely no difference what standard 
an authority uses
28
 
(ii) in the absence of marginal cost-reducing efficiencies, the TW standard weakly 
dominates the CS standard. 
This result can be easily seen to hold by comparing (11) to (13). When there are no 
efficiencies of any kind, then both ∆CS and ∆TW are negative for all values of ε
29
. In this 
case, no action will be allowed under any standard. When, however, there are no marginal 
cost-reducing efficiencies (∆c = 0 ), but ∆F > 0, so there are other profit-enhancing 
efficiencies, then while ∆CS < 0 for all values of ε, ∆TW may well be positive for some ε.  
Thus, in this case it is better to use a TW standard since with such a standard some welfare 
enhancing actions will be allowed while with a CS standard all actions will be banned. 
Consider next the case where there are marginal-cost reducing efficiencies: ∆c > 0 . It 
is this case that the choice between a CS and a TW standard becomes very important. 
Depending on the environment in which actions are taken, the extant market power, the 
difference in the market power raising effects of actions and the size or asymmetries in the 
efficiencies, the two standards can lead to distinctly different results. 
We assume that 0≤µ
0
<µ1<µ2<1/2. So action 2 is more profitable than action 1 and 
so will be chosen whenever both are available (allowed), though that will lead to lower total 
welfare than the total welfare that could be reached if action 1 had been chosen. If we define 
 then: 
•  
                                                          
28 The significance of this result is of course best understood when the simplifying assumptions of perfect detection and no 
errors by the CA are relaxed. Under these assumptions, in the absence of any efficiencies firms will not take any action, 
irrespective of the substantive standard used by the CA.  
29
 Τhe latter is negative because the reduction in consumer surplus in (11) outweighs the increase in profit in (12). 
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•   
Figure 2 illustrates the two functions  as functions of the inverse elasticity ε 
(keeping  µ0  constant) and also locates the points . In Figure 2 we use curves 
with solid lines to show the changes in consumer surplus, profits and total welfare for action 
1 and with dashed lines for action 2.    
(Figure 2 here) 
By denoting with  and  the change in total welfare given the optimal 
choice of the action by the firm under a TW standard and a CS standard respectively we can 
see that: 
• For    both actions 1 and 2 generate positive consumer surplus and hence 
positive total welfare and so both will be allowed under both standards. Hence, action 
2 will be chosen, and so   
• For   only action 1 generates positive consumer surplus, though both will 
generate positive total welfare. So action 1 will be chosen by firms under a CS 
criterion while action 2 will be chosen under a TW criterion. So we have 
. So a CS standard generates higher 
welfare than a TW standard in this range of environments.  This is the Lyons effect. 
• For    neither action generates positive consumer surplus, and so neither 
would be chosen by firms under a CS standard. However, both generate positive total 
welfare and so since both would be available under such a standard, action 2 will be 
chosen. Hence on this interval, welfare is higher under a TW standard since 
. 
• For   only action 1 generates positive total welfare and so action 1 will be 
chosen under a TW criterion, but since neither action generates positive consumer 
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surplus on this interval neither will be chosen under a CS criterion. Hence, in this 
range of environments, welfare is higher under a TW standard since 
. 
• Finally, for  neither action generates positive welfare and so, a fortiori, neither 
generates positive consumer surplus. Hence under both standards only the default 
action will be chosen, generating zero welfare, so on this interval 
. 
So we have: 
Proposition 3  
When there are two mutually exclusive actions ( that a firm might take, with 0 
, and there are marginal cost-reducing efficiencies, ∆c > 0 , there is one 
interval of environments,  for which welfare is higher under a CS standard. 
The intuition is that such a standard induces firms to undertake the less profitable action 1 
thus generating higher total welfare.   
There is another interval  for which welfare is lower under a CS standard 
since this standard forces firms to do nothing, so generating zero change in welfare whereas 
under a TW standard there is always one non-trivial welfare enhancing action that will be 
chosen and this generates positive increase in welfare.   
For the environments with underlying competitiveness  and  the CS 
standard and the TW standard are equivalent in terms of outcomes: in the first case all 
actions are allowed under both standards and in the second case all actions are banned under 
both standards.  
So, if there are actions that increase profits but lower consumer surplus, then using a 
CS standard can increase welfare in those cases where it restricts choice but still leaves firms 
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with a non-trivial action they can take. However, using such a standard will lower welfare 
when it restricts choice to just the trivial action, while there are non-trivial actions that 
contribute positively to welfare. 
Thus, whether on average one standard is better than the other one depends on the 
distribution of environments (the distribution of ε when considering  constant) and the 
critical values  which, in turn, depend on the extant market power, the size of 
marginal cost-reducing efficiencies and the parameters characterizing the actions. We turn to 
a consideration of these in the next sub-section.  
 
3.2 Effects of extant market power, marginal cost-reducing efficiencies and the difference 
of the price-cost margin between actions 
So far we have considered the parameter of extant market power (  as a given and 
constant parameter and examined the choice of the optimal welfare standard under different 
values of ε
30
. We are now interested to examine how extant market power affects the 
comparison between CS and TW standards. It is worth remembering that the enforcement of 
competition law in monopolization (US) or abuse of dominance (EU) cases is characterized 
by a two-stage process in which it is first established whether there is “significant” extant 
market power
31
 and only if this is the case the anti-competitive impact of the challenged 
action is examined. So an examination of how the magnitude of extant market power affects 
the comparison between CS and TW standards is very important.  
We also examine the effect of a number of other important parameters, again 
considering two mutually exclusive actions characterized by µ1, µ2 and symmetric efficiency 
effects ∆c>0. Specifically, we examine how the size of marginal cost-reducing efficiencies 
                                                          
30
 Till now ε was the only parameter that characterised the different environments from which a firm would come from. 
31 One issue is of course, that we by-pass here, is that it is not at all clear how to interpret the term “significant” here as has 
been stressed, for example, by Kaplow and Shapiro (2007). 
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affects the comparison of standards, given  and the environment in which the action is 
undertaken and how the size of the difference in the market power raising effects of different 
actions (the difference between ) affects the comparison, given the size of efficiencies 
and the environment.  
We have seen that the critical level of elasticity for each action is: 
           (20) 
Since as we have shown already in the previous section, for any two actions 1 and 2, 
the Lyons effect appears only in the interval , the range of environments over which 
the Lyons effect holds increases/decreases as the difference  increase/decreases. From 
(20) we can see that the difference  takes the following form: 
       (21) 
From (21) we can see that: 
Lemma 4: the difference  increases, so the range over which the Lyons effect 
holds increases 
(i) the higher the extant market power of the firm (given the market power 
enhancing effects of actions 1 and 2 ) 
(ii) The higher the marginal cost-reducing efficiencies 
(iii)The higher the difference between the market power enhancing effects of the two 
mutually exclusive actions. 
Concerning (i), as we can see from (20), when  increase the critical values of  for 
both actions (j=1,2) increase. However, the critical value for the action with the lowest price-
cost margin ( in our example) will increase more than the critical value of the more 
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anticompetitive action ( . So both  move to the right (in Figure 2) from an 
increase in extant market power, but  moves even further. 
Also as we have seen in the previous section in the interval ] the CS standard is 
worse than the TW standard, since it forces firms to do nothing while it would be welfare 
enhancing to take an action. Algebraic calculations show that this difference is (with ∆F = 0): 
   (22) 
From Lemma 4 (iii) the Lyons effect increases the higher the difference in the market 
power raising effect of the actions ( , while from (22) the range  is not 
affected by this difference
32
. This leads to: 
Proposition 4 
Given two mutually exclusive actions with  and :  
(i) The TW standard will dominate the CS standard when the difference in the 
market power raising effect of the actions ( , is sufficiently small. 
(ii) The CS standard will dominate the TW standard when the market power raising 
effect of action 2 (with the higher market power raising effect) is sufficiently 
larger than the market power raising effect of action 1. 
Essentially, the greater the difference in the market power raising effect of the actions the 
greater the range of environments over which the Lyons effect holds while the range of 
environments over which the CS standard is worse than the TW standard remains unchanged. 
Thus, when two mutually exclusive actions have the same marginal cost-reducing efficiency 
effect but one of them increases market power much more relative to the other, a stricter 
standard like the CS standard will be the optimal standard as this will force firms to choose 
the action with the lower market power raising effect. 
                                                          
32 Since it is not affected by  
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Comparison of the substantive standards on the basis of numerical simulations 
In order to make further progress in our comparison of the CS and TW standards we 
need to be able to compare the range of environments over which each standard will be 
superior. For this we have to rely on numerical simulations.  
One may be tempted to say that a standard is superior if it is superior over a greater 
range of environments than the other standard. However this would hold only when the 
distribution of ε-environments is uniform and this is an unrealistic assumption. Below we 
undertake the numerical analysis in terms of elasticities ( , rather than inverse elasticities 
(ε), for easier comparisons. It seems reasonable to assume that elasticity values at the 
competitive equilibrium will be concentrated in the range between about 0,5 and about 2.  
We start by comparing standards for different (symmetric) cost efficiency effects 
(Table 1). 
Table 1: Effect of an increase in cost efficiency effects  
Numerical example for  , ∆F = 0 
  5   
 0.5 0.75 1 1.25 
 2.55 3.82 5.1 6.37 
 0.17 0.25 0.33 0.42 
 0.76 1.14 1.52 1.9 
Range of elasticity values over 
which CS standard is better 
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[2 to 5.88] [1,33 to 4] [1 to 3,03] [0.8 to 2,38] 
Range of elasticity values over 
which TW standard is better 
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[0,39 to 2] [0,26 to 1,33] [0,19 to 1] [0,15 to 0,8] 
We first note that the range of elasticities over which the CS standard is better is 
always greater than the range of environments over which the TW standard is better, so if 
                                                          
33
  
34
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elasticities were uniformly distributed then on average it would be better to use the CS 
standard. However, as already noted, this is not a realistic assumption. 
We also note from Table 1, that if efficiencies are low, ∆c < 0,15, the range of 
elasticity values over which the TW standard is better are the ones more likely to hold in the 
competitive equilibrium and this range is reasonably large, so the TW standard is likely to be 
the superior standard when efficiencies are low. On the other hand, if efficiencies are quite 
high, ∆c > 0,15, the range of elasticity values over which the CS standard is better are the 
ones more likely to hold and this range is large, so the CS standard is going to be the superior 
standard when efficiencies are quite high.  
The findings of Table 1 are confirmed by a large number of other numerical 
examples
35
. So we have: 
Proposition 5 
Given two mutually exclusive actions with  and , the CS standard 
will dominate a TW standard when there are large marginal cost-reducing efficiencies 
while the TW standard is likely to dominate when marginal cost-reducing efficiencies 
are small. 
Let us next construct the range of environments, in terms of the value of elasticity at 
the competitive equilibrium, over which the CS standard or the TW standard will be superior 
and examine how this varies with extant market power, as in the example in Table 2 below.   
Table 2: Effect of an increase in extant market power  
Numerical example for , ∆F = 0 
       
 0.47 0.57 0.73 1 1.6 4 
 3.37 3.61 4.11 5.10 7.41 16.94 
 0.22 0.25 0.29 0.33 0.4 0.5 
                                                          
35 The results of numerical simulations undertaken in this section are available from the authors on request.  
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 1.31 1.34 1.41 1.52 1.70 1.97 
Range of elasticity 
values over which CS 
standard is better 
 
[2,127 to 
4,54] 
[1,75 to 4] [1,36 to 3,34] [1 to 3,03] [0,62 to 2,5] [0,25 to 2] 
Range of elasticity 
values over which TW 
standard is better 
 
[0,29 to 
2,127] 
[0,27 to 1,75] [0,24 to1,36] [0,19 to 1] [0,13 to 0,62] 
[0,059 to 
0,25] 
 
A number of observations can be made in relation to Table 2 above. First, we note 
again that the range of elasticities over which the CS standard is better is always greater than 
the range of environments over which the TW standard is better. So if elasticities are 
uniformly distributed then on average it will be better to use the CS standard. However, this 
cannot be generalised and will not hold in other numerical examples. It will hold when 
, is quite large, as indicated in Proposition 5. 
Second, the difference in the two ranges of elasticities (that favouring the CS standard 
over that favouring the TW standard) increases as extant market power µ0  increases. For 
sufficiently high extant market power clearly the CS standard dominates the TW standard. 
Since it is more reasonable to assume that elasticities will not be uniformly distributed 
we should note, from Table 2, that if extant market power is low, µ0 < 0,15, the range of 
elasticities over which the TW standard is better are the ones more likely to hold and this 
range is reasonably large, so the TW standard is likely to be the superior standard when 
extant market power is low. On the other hand, if extant market power is quite high, µ0 > 
0,20, the range of elasticities over which the CS standard is better are the ones more likely to 
hold and this range is large, so the CS standard is going to be the superior standard when 
extant market power is quite high. Assuming that the difference in the market power raising 
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effect of the actions ( , is not very small, these results are confirmed by a very large 
number of other numerical examples. So we have:  
Proposition 6 
Given two mutually exclusive actions with  and  and assuming that 
the difference in the market power raising effect of the actions ( , is not very 
small, then when extant market power is low elasticities that are more likely to hold
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are found in the ranges favoring the TW standard. On the other hand, as extant market 
power becomes higher both the range of elasticities over which the CS standard is 
superior increases relative to the range that the TW standard is superior and also 
elasticities that are more likely to hold are found in the ranges favoring the CS 
standard. So the TW standard will dominate the CS standard for low extant market 
power while the CS standard will certainly dominate the TW standard for significant 
extant market power. These results are important since they suggest that in all cases 
where significant extant market power is a prerequisite for the enforcement of 
Competition Law it is best to use a CS standard
37
. 
We now turn to the case of actions also differing in marginal cost-reducing effects. 
 
3.3 Extension: comparison when actions differ in efficiencies 
So far we have considered above actions which differ only in their market power effects. 
It is worth considering what happens in the more general case where actions differ also in the 
extent of their marginal cost reduction (∆c).   
As above we assume that there are just two non-trivial actions and 
.    
                                                          
36 At the competitive equilibrium. 
37 Essentially, all cases other than horizontal agreements or cartels. For an excellent detailed discussion of the justifications 
for setting the high existing market power prerequisite see Kaplow and Shapiro (2007). 
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There are then two cases to consider: 
Case 1:  
Here action 2 results in a higher price-cost margin but also a greater reduction in costs. This 
has two implications: 
• For all environments action 2 will generate a bigger increase in profits than action 1 
and so will always be chosen if both are available; 
• But now it is less clear how the two actions compare from the point of view of both 
consumer surplus and total welfare.   
If  is quite close to  then everything will be dominated by the increase in the 
price-cost margin and the previous results will go through.   
Consider then the other extreme where the cost differences are very large. In 
particular consider the situation where . This implies that    
and so, whenever action 1 is profitable under a CS standard, so too is action 2. In this case, 
under a CS standard action 2 will always be chosen whenever a non-trivial action is available. 
Now if action 2 is profitable under a CS standard it is profitable under a TW standard, and so 
will be chosen when a TW standard is used. So: 
• Whenever a non-trivial action is chosen under a CS standard this will be action 2 and 
this will also be chosen under a TW standard so generating the same level of welfare; 
• However, for those environments for which    action 2 will be chosen 
under a TW standard while only the trivial action will be chosen under a CS standard, 
and so, for these environments it is certainly the case that welfare is higher under a 
TW standard than under a CS standard. 
Proposition 7 
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If between two mutually exclusive actions, the cost differences are sufficiently large in 
favour of the action with the higher market power effect, specifically if 
 then a TW standard welfare dominates a CS standard. 
Case 2:  
Here action 2 generates a greater increase in market power but lower reduction in costs than 
action 1. This has two implications: 
• Under both a CS and a TW standard action 2 is worse than action 1 in all 
environments – in particular, ; 
• However, it is less clear which of the two actions is more profitable.   
To understand this latter point define     so .   
Then it is possible to show the following: 
I. If    then action 2 is more profitable than action 1 in every environment 
and so the analysis goes through exactly as in the simple case where . 
II. If   then if we let ,  then action 1 is more profitable than action 2 
if  while action 2 is more profitable than action 1 if . So what matters now 
is how relates to . In particular we have: 
a. If   then the conclusions about the relative welfare levels under a 
CS standard and under a TW standard go through exactly as in the case where 
. That is welfare is higher under a CS standard (i.e. there is a 
Lyons effect) if   but higher under a TW standard if  .  
The only difference is that for  then under both a CS standard and a TW 
standard action 1 is chosen and so private and social incentives are aligned. 
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b. If   then the Lyons effect only operates for . 
c. If  then there is no Lyons effect and a CS standard is worse than a TW 
standard. 
Proposition 8 
The greater the cost differences in favour of the action with the lower market power 
effect, that is the further is  below  then the less likely is the Lyons effect to exist, 
and it may disappear altogether if  lies sufficiently far below . 
By combining proposition 7 and 8 we see that: 
Corollary 1  
The greater the asymmetry in efficiencies between actions the more likely that the TW 
standard is the optimal standard.  
This result contrasts with Proposition 5 according to which if marginal cost-reducing 
efficiencies are the same across actions, the CS standard will dominate the TW standard 
when these efficiencies are large.  
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper we have presented a simple but general framework within which to examine the 
choice between the CS and TW substantive standards for Competition Law enforcement, 
when this choice depends on the level of aggregate welfare generated by each standard. We 
have shown that, in the absence of any efficiencies the two standards lead to exactly the same 
outcomes. A choice between them becomes important however when there are marginal-cost 
reducing efficiencies: ∆c > 0 . In this case, depending on the environment in which actions 
are taken, the extant market power, the difference in the market power raising effects of 
actions and the size or asymmetries in the efficiencies, the two standards can lead to distinctly 
different results. Specifically, we start by showing that there will exist market environments 
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for which having a CS standard may induce firms to choose lower-profit actions that result in 
higher total welfare than would higher-profit actions, which would be chosen under a TW 
standard. However, there will be some other environments for which welfare is higher when a 
TW standard is used, because the CS standard may be too strict and deter firms from taking 
any action even though there are welfare-enhancing actions that could have been chosen. 
We then examine how the range of environments over which the Lyons effect is 
present depends on parameters such as the extant market power of the firms, the size and 
asymmetry or otherwise of efficiency effects and the strength of the market power raising 
effect generated by different actions. We show that the CS standard will be the optimal 
choice, when the extant market power is significant, when the size of marginal cost-reducing 
efficiency effects is large and when the difference in the market power raising effects of 
mutually exclusive actions is large. Thus, arguments in favour of a CS standard are, ceteris 
paribus, more likely to be valid when the actions challenged are undertaken by firms that 
have significant market power to start with. This is important as it suggests that in all cases 
where significant extant market power is a prerequisite for the enforcement of Competition 
Law it is best to use a CS standard. Also, ceteris paribus, a CS standard is going to be 
optimal when we deal with actions that can generate substantial efficiencies.  
An obvious extension to the analysis above is to adopt the framework of Katsoulacos 
and Ulph (2015) which allows for decision errors and delays. Since decision errors and 
delays in decision-making affect the extent to which firms are led to choose one action rather 
than another these will affect the range of environments over which the Lyons effect will 
hold. But to the extent that delays and decision errors might be higher for a TW standard than 
for a CS standard, given that under the former additional considerations need to be taken into 
account in order to reach a decision, this introduces a potentially different reason for 
choosing a CS standard even if the overall goal of policy is total welfare. 
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